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I. INTRODUCTION
James Wilson helped shape two Constitutions: the United States
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. An examination of
Wilson’s role in creating these documents reveals that Wilson was one
of the most influential founding fathers of the 18th century. This paper
will show that Wilson admired federalism, the system whereby the
federal government engages in limited, enumerated activity, while states
1
and the people retain much authority. This paper will also demonstrate
1

See
Andreas
Follesdal,
Federalism,
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (defining federalism
generally).
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that James Wilson favored limiting the power of legislatures, with the
judiciary serving a fundamental role in that process. Finally, reviewing
Wilson’s work in the context Supreme Court case law will show that
while health care may be a market within which the federal government
can efficiently and effectively participate, penalizing individuals for not
buying government mandated health care is not constitutional under the
Commerce Clause.
II. JAMES WILSON’S ROLE IN CREATING THE
CONSTITUTION
James Wilson was born near St. Andrews, Scotland on September
2
3
14, 1742. Wilson immigrated to Pennsylvania in 1765. James Madison
is often said to be the “founder of the Constitution,” with Wilson
following the votes of Madison on key issues such as the Connecticut
4
Compromise. But in 1787, Wilson was ten years older than Madison
5
and had more legislative experience. The view that Madison is the
father of the Constitution is linked to Madison creating the Virginia
Plan and his role as speaker and note-taker during the Constitutional
6
Convention. Yet, if one looks at the United States Constitution’s
creation in its entirety, it is apparent that Wilson had a major influence
7
at various stages in the creation process. Wilson spoke more times than
Madison during the convention, and Wilson’s views on all three federal
8
branches were largely incorporated into the Constitution.
While Wilson and Madison often voted the same way, their
underlying philosophies were considerably divergent. For example,
2
John Osborne & James Gerencser, James Wilson, THEIR OWN WORDS (July 9, 2003),
http://deila.dickinson.edu/theirownwords/author/WilsonJ.htm (examiningWilson’s
biography).
3
Ashbrook Ctr. for PUB. AFF., Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: James
Wilson,TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/de
legates/wilson.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (examining Wilson’s biography).
4
William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.PA. J. CON.
LAW 901, 901 (2008).
5
Interview with William Ewald, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School
(Sept. 27, 2011).
6
Ewald, supra note 4, at 963. See also James Madison, Journal, Tuesday May 29, 1787,
of the Constitutional Convention, reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 49- 50 (Max Farrand, , Yale Univ. Press 1911) (recording the introduction of the
Virginia plan by Edmund Randolph in Madison’s notes).
7
Ewald, supra note 4 generally.
8
Id. See also Farrand, supra note 6 generally.
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9

Madison believed in a system of filtration. Under a filtration system,
people vote for House representatives who elect the Senate, who then
10
elects a President (along with judges). Wilson, on the other hand, was
11
an advocate of popular representation in its own right. On May 31,
1787, both Wilson and Madison voted for a bicameral legislature with
12
popular representation in the House of Representatives.
On June 15, 1787, Wilson first protested the New Jersey plan on
the grounds that it encompassed a unicameral legislature and a plurality
13
presidency. Madison soon followed Wilson in opposing the New
14
Jersey plan. Wilson also argued throughout the convention for a
singular president, elected for a short period of time, with the power to
15
veto bills, and authority separate from the legislature and judiciary.
Where Madison wanted property interests represented by the legislature,
16
Wilson argued ardently against such representation.
Wilson’s influence was palpable both during and after debate of
the Constitution. The words “We the People” were almost assuredly of
17
Wilson’s mind. These words emphasize Wilson’s strong views on
individual liberty within a federalist system. Whereas Madison left
shortly after the July 16, 1787 vote for the Connecticut Compromise (a
peculiar name considering that Oliver Ellsworth of the Connecticut
Delegation was not present when the Compromise was created), James
Wilson stayed to complete the Constitution and was one of five
18
members on the Committee of Detail (“COD”). The other members
were John Rutledge (Chair, South Carolina), Edmund Randolph
(Virginia), Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts) and Oliver Ellsworth
19
(Connecticut). On July 26, 1787, the COD began to finalize a draft of
9

Ewald, supra note 4, at 943.
Farrand, supra note 6.
11
Ewald, supra note 4, at 963.
12
Farrand, supra note 6, at 54.
13
Id. at 254.
14
Ewald, supra note 4, at 972.
15
Id. at 950-51.
16
Id. at 979-81.
17
Id. at 988. See also Elizabeth Stuart, BYU Graduate May Have Found Draft of U.S.
TIMES,
Feb.
6,
2010,
available
at
Constitution,
MORMON
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700007460/BYU-graduate-may-have-found-draft-ofUS-Constitution.html (stating that the phrase “We the people” was found on the back of the
first draft of the Constitution in Wilson’s hand-writing).
18
Ewald, supra note 4, at 982-83.
19
Id.
10
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20

the Constitution to present to the states for ratification.
The COD, with Wilson as an important member, was responsible
for aspects of the Constitution such as the Article I, Section 8 Necessary
and Proper Clause (written by Wilson), the Article I, Section 8
Enumerated Powers (written by Edmund Randolph & John Rutledge),
the Article VI, Clause 2 Supremacy Clause (written by Wilson), the Full
Faith and Credit Clause (written by Rutledge)), and the Article IV,
Section 2 Privilege and Immunities Clause (written by Wilson or
21
Rutledge).
Wilson did not participate in the creation of the enumeration of
powers because he wanted Congress to have general powers, which
22
would have expanded the parameters of congressional authority.
However, Randolph and Rutledge were able to ensure that Congress’
23
power was listed in Article I. Although Wilson was able to put the
Necessary and Proper Clause into Article I, Section 8 to enlarge the
scope of the enumerated rights, the clause was blunted by the
enumeration in Article I, Section 8. After Wilson’s work on the COD
was finished, Wilson emphasized the enumeration of federal rights as a
reason for ratification by the states.\
III. WILSON’S VIEWS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF
THE LEGISLATURE
If James Wilson represents such an important figure in American
constitutional history, an examination of his thoughts on constitutional
power after the Committee of Detail created the Constitution is
important for understanding the rights of the federal legislature. It is
clear that Wilson believed the activities of the legislature needed to be
24
monitored and restricted, including by the judiciary, in some respect. It
is equally clear that Wilson understood the impact of Rutledge and
Randolph’s addition of enumerated rights for Congress in terms of
25
ensuring that Congress had a tangible parameter in which to operate.
20

Id.
Id. at 986-92.
22
Farrand, supra note 6, at 49. See also Ewald, supra note 4, at 986-7.
23
Ewald, supra note 4, at 987.
24
Ewald, supra note 4, at 996-7.
25
James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 339-340 (John M.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (emphasis added).
21
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Wilson’s State House Yard Speech on October 6, 1787, defending
the United States Constitution to the Pennsylvania Legislature, was
imperative to the passing of the Constitution by both the Pennsylvania
26
Legislature and Congress. The speech was sent to George Washington,
who then circulated it to other delegates attempting to persuade their
states’ citizenry that America needed to replace the Articles of
27
Confederation with a stronger national government. In this speech,
Wilson stated:
It will be proper . . . to mark the leading discrimination between the
state constitutions and the constitution of the United States. When
the people established the powers of legislation under their separate
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore
upon every question respecting the jurisdiction of the house of
assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the jurisdiction is
efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another
criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority
is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive
grant expressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident, that
in the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but in
the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything
which is not given, is reserved.
This distinction being recognized, will furnish an answer to those
who think the omission of a bill of rights a defect in the proposed
constitution: for it would have been superfluous and absurd to have
stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we should
enjoy those privileges of which we are not divested either by the
intention or the act that has brought that body into existence. For
instance, the liberty of the press, which has been a copious source of
declamation and opposition, what controul can proceed from the
federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of
national freedom? If indeed, a power similar to that which has been
granted for the regulation of commerce, had been granted to
regulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to
stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate,
28
as that the impost should be general in its operation.

Wilson makes two separate important points. The first point is that
states have all the rights not explicitly reserved by the people, but that
26
27
28

Ewald, supra note 4, at 913.
Id.
JAMES WILSON, supra note 25 (emphasis added).
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the federal government only has those rights explicitly granted under the
29
Constitution. This statement is in line with the creation and
maintenance of a federalist system, with the states and federal
government having separate, identifiable roles. Where the federal
government is authorized to act, its actions take precedence under
30
Article VI, Clause 2, better known as the Supremacy Clause. Where
the federal government cannot act because it has not been given an
explicit right, the states and the people reserve their power.
Wilson’s first point coincides with his second point, that a bill of
rights is unnecessary. An initial reading of this statement might lead one
to believe that Wilson was not an advocate of individual rights.
However, a deeper analysis exposes the concept that individual rights
are at the heart of Wilson’s statements. If the federal government only
possesses a limited amount of enumerated rights to act, then
documenting our individual liberties is in fact unnecessary because the
state, or the people, would already possess any rights outside of the
parameters of Articles I, II, and III. Thus, the enumerated powers listed
in Article I, Section 8 would constitute the parameters of legislative
authority, taking into account the narrow expansion of legislative rights
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and outside of those
parameters, the states and the people would be able to operate freely.
Wilson also expressed his views on legislative authority during a
series of lectures that he gave at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Wilson wrote:
I come now to the last head, under which I proposed to treat
concerning the legislative department: this was, to consider the
powers vested in Congress by the constitution of the United States.
On this subject, we discover a striking difference between the
constitution of the United States and that of Pennsylvania. By the
latter, each house of the general assembly is vested with every power
necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free state. In the
former, no clause of such an extensive and unqualified import is to
be found. The reason is plain. The latter institutes a legislature with
general, the former, with enumerated, powers. Those enumerated
31
powers are now subject for consideration.
29

Id.
Office of the Secretary of the Senate, S.Pub 103-21, Constitution of the United States
and notes, available at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm.
31
James Wilson, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania – Of the
Legislative Departmemt, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 870 (Kermit
30
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During his lecture on constitutional legislative authority, Wilson
did not seem to think much about the Commerce Clause’s ability to
expand the enumerated rights of the federal government, stating simply,
“It is an object of the national government to ‘form a more perfect
union.’ On this principle, congress is empowered to regulate commerce
32
among the several states, to establish post offices . . . .”
Wilson’s lectures again reflect a distrust of the legislature. When
comparing the U.S. Constitution with the British Constitution, Wilson
wrote:
[T]he order of things in Britain is exactly the reverse of the order of
things in the United StatesFalse’An act of parliament, in England,
can never be unconstitutional, in the strict and proper acceptation of
the term: in a lower sense it may; viz. when it militates with the
spirit, contradicts the analogy, or defeats the provision of other laws,
33
made to regulate the form of government.’

Wilson’s comparison illustrates a salient point: actions by the
United States Congress can be unconstitutional, if those actions are
outside the scope of Congress’ enumerated rights.
Wilson’s lectures illuminate how he views the judiciary in terms of
checking the power of the legislature. On Great Britain, Wilson wrote
“. . . there is a very improper mixture of legislative and judicial
authority vested and blended in the same assembly. This is entirely
34
avoided in the Constitution of the United States.” Wilson fought to
ensure that the judiciary was a separate and co-equal branch of the
35
federal government, a branch not subordinate to the legislature.
While attempting (ultimately successfully) to persuade
Pennsylvania to adopt the United States Constitution, Wilson stated:
In order, sir, to give permanency, stability and security to any
government, I conceive it of essential importance, that its legislature
should be restrained; tat there should not only be what we call a
passive, but an active power over it. For of all kinds of despotism,
this is the most dreadful and the most difficult to be correctedFalse
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
32
Id. at 872.
33
James Wilson, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States with That of
Great Britain, reprinted in 1 Collected Works of James Wilson 719-20 (Kermit L. Hall &
Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
34
Id. at 736.
35
Gerard J. St. John, James Wilson: A Forgotten Father, THE PHIL. LAWYER, Winter
2004,
available
at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/TPLWinter04James
Wilson?appNum=1.
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These restraints arise from difference sourcesFalse Under this system
they may arise likewise from the interference of those officers, who
36
will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments.

Wilson’s work with Pennsylvania’s Constitution is illustrative.
Wilson disliked the lack of checks and balances in Pennsylvania’s
legislature before 1790 (namely, an unicameral legislature, executive
officers removed at will, and an unsettled judiciary) and was the
primary author of Pennsylvania’s new Constitution in 1790 providing
for a bicameral legislature, an executive with a limited veto, and an
37
independent judiciary.
Wilson’s general approach to constitutional interpretation can also
be discerned from his time on the United States Supreme Court from
38
1789 until his death on August 28, 1798. This analysis includes his
39
seminal opinion, Chisholm v. Georgia.
40

Van Staphorst v. Maryland – This was the first case docketed by
41
the Supreme Court. James Wilson would have heard the arguments
concerning the Van Staphorst brothers lending money to Maryland and
42
the state allegedly defaulting on the loan (according to the lenders).
However, the parties settled the case prior to argument before the
43
Court.
44

West v. Barnes - The Court decided the case on procedural
grounds, ruling that a writ of error must be issued by the clerk of the

36
James Wilson, An Address to the Delegation of Pennsylvania on the Subject of the
Federal Constitution (Dec.1, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER
PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 245 (Jonathan Elliott ed.,
1830) (emphasis added).
37
Penn Biographies, James Wilson (1742-1798), University of Pennsylvania University
Archives and Records Center, available at
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/wilson_jas.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
38
Ashbrook Ctr. for PUB. AFF., supra note 3.
39
Wilson, James (1742-1798), in AMERICAN ERAS (1997), available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/James_Wilson.aspx; 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419(1793).
40
Van Staphorst v. Maryland (1791).
41
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 8 (Maeva March
eds., Columbia University Press 1996).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401, 401 (1791).
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45

Supreme Court of the United States.
46

Case of Hayburn - Wilson’s judicial actions here illustrate his
view that legislative power is finite. “In 1792, Congress enacted
legislation that required the United States Circuit Courts to hear
disability pension claims for veterans of the American Revolutionary
47
War and to certify their findings to the Secretary of War.” James
Wilson and four other Supreme Court justices, sitting as Circuit Court
judges, tendered opinions in letter form
to President George
48
Washington declining to serve in that capacity.
Wilson wrote in his letter to Washington, “[i]t is worthy to remark,
that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not
vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people
49
themselves, when they ordained or established the Constitution.”
Wilson further wrote “[u]pon due consideration, we have been
unanimously of the opinion, that, the circuit court held for the
Pennsylvania district could not proceed; Because the business directed
of this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested
50
by the Constitution in the Courts of the United States. . .”
Hayburn demonstrates that Wilson believed that each branch of the
federal government was given a parameter within which to operate
under the Constitution. The three branches cannot impose restrictions
on each other if the right to do so is not found in the Constitution.
Wilson’s earlier remarks that the whole of the legislative power is not
found in Congress further indicates that he was not a proponent of the
federal government acting outside the scope of powers granted
explicitly in the Constitution.

45

Id.
Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792).
47
Kermit L. Hall, Hayburns Case, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2005),
available
at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/
topic/Hayburns_Case.aspx.
48
Id. (emphasis added).
49
JAMES WILSON, HAYBURN’S CASE, 2 U.S. 409, 411-414 (1792), reprinted in
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1, 346-347 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds.,
2007) (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 347. (emphasis added).
46
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51

Chisholm v. Georgia - Wilson’s most well known decision
continues to show that he was a strong proponent of individual liberty
and looked to the words in the Constitution to establish the parameters
of federal power. In Chisholm, Alexander Chisholm attempted to sue
Georgia in the United States Circuit Court for money owed to the
testator, Robert Farquhar, for goods that Farquhar supplied to Georgia
52
during the American Revolutionary War. Georgia refused to appear,
53
stating that appearance would waive any objection to jurisdiction. A
courtroom reporter later observed, “Georgia was right in not appearing
in this action” because Chief Justice John Jay “said from the bench that
had the State pleaded it would have been an acknowledgement of the
54
jurisdiction of the Court.”
Wilson wrote a lengthy opinion upholding the individual’s right to
sue a state in federal court and emphasizing federalism under the
55
Constitution. “Let a State be considered as subordinate to the
56
PEOPLE: but let every thing else be subordinate to the State.”
Wilson’s opinion further reads “[a] State, like a merchant, makes a
contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, wilfully [sic]
57
refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice.”
Wilson emphasized that it is the people who maintain the most rights
under our Constitutional framework.
Wilson turned to the words in the Constitution to decide the case.
First, Justice Cushing wrote:
The point turns not upon the law or practice of England. . .but upon
the Constitution established by the people of the United States; and
particularly upon the extent of powers given to the Federal Judicial
in the 2d section of the 3d article of the ConstitutionFalseThe
judicial power, then, is expressly extended to ‘controversies, between
58
a State and citizens of another StateFalse

Wilson then wrote, “Could the strictest legal language . . . describe,
51

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419(1793).
Chisholm v. Georgia, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (2005), available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Chisholm_v._Georgia.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
53
Id.
54
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1559, 1593 (2002).
55
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466.
56
Id. at 455.
57
Id. at 456.
58
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466.
52
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with more precise accuracy, the cause now depending before the
59
tribunal?”
Wilson believed the Constitution’s words and phrases formed the
outer bounds for the powers of federal branches. Here, the words
explicitly stated that an individual could sue a state in federal court, so
60
the judiciary had the power to hear the case. Because the states, or
rather the people, were not satisfied with this result, the Eleventh
Amendment was passed, and a state could no longer be sued by an
individual from another state (or under Hans v. Louisiana, by citizens of
61
their own state).
Chisholm is incredibly important in understanding the parameters
of federal-branch power under the Constitution. Chisholm also shows
the Court’s role in determining through judicial review whether an act is
constitutional, albeit a judicial act. Wilson’s opinion here shows that he
believed 1) in judicial review and 2) that it is the Constitution’s words
and phrases that give the federal government the entirety of its power.
62

Georgia v. Brailsford - This case involves Chief Justice Jay
instructing a jury that the jury has the right to decide both facts and law
63
in a trial. Although Wilson was still on the Supreme Court in 1794, he
64
did not deliver a separate opinion in Brailsford.
65

United States v. Peters - This case held that the federal district
court had no jurisdiction over a foreign individual because a ship was
not within the jurisdiction of the court. Wilson did not deliver a
66
separate opinion in Peters.
67

Talbot v. Janson - Talbot held that the jurisdiction of the Court
extended to the seas and that a citizen of the United States could also be
68
a citizen of another state. Wilson did not deliver a separate opinion in
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
Id. at 4.
See generally Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
Id.
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
Id.

GOODING FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

42

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/12/2011 2:25 PM

Vol. 36:1

Talbot.
69

Hilton v. United States - This case held that a tax on carriages did
not violate Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, mandating
70
apportionment. Importantly, the Court used judicial review to
determine that the Congressional statute was constitutional. Wilson
wrote a short opinion joining the majority and stating that his views had
not changed from the opinion he wrote while in the Virginia Circuit
71
Court. However, no copy of his opinion in Virginia’s Circuit Court
72
exists.
73

Henfield’s Case - In this Circuit Court case, a jury was
determining whether Henfield committed an act of hostility against
74
members of a United States peace treaty, thus violating the treaty.
Pertaining to the case, Wilson stated, “[t]he Constitution of the United
States has declared that all treaties made, or to be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be part of the supreme law of the
75
land.” Wilson’s statements to the jury further show his strict adherence
to his belief that federal action should be guided by the words actually
in the Constitution.
76

Ware v. Hylton - In Ware, the Court held that the Treaty of Paris,
providing that British creditors from before the American Revolution
could recover debts owed to them by Americans, overrode a Virginia
77
law nullifying these same debts. Wilson agreed that the constitutional
78
right to make a treaty was supreme to Virginia state law. Wilson
reiterated his view that the Constitution protects individual rights,
69

Hilton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
Id. at 173.
71
Id.
72
Daniel B. Evans, The Tax Protestor FAQ, EVANS-LEGAL.COM, http://evanslegal.com/dan/tpfaq.html. (last updated Feb. 27, 2011).
73
Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793); 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON, supra note 33, at 367.
74
Lecture on Law by James Wilson (1790-2), 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON,
supra note 33, at 368.
75
Id. at 368.
76
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
77
Id. at 281.
78
Id.
70
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stating, “. . . the Constitution of the United States authoritatively
79
inculcates the obligation of contracts.”
Wilson’s actions in securing independent judicial and executive
branches of the United States and Pennsylvania, his speeches after the
Constitutional Convention, and his Supreme Court opinions all suggest
that Wilson believed the legislature was capable of abusing its power
and that other branches, along with the people, needed to serve as
watch-dogs over the legislature. Wilson also emphasized that the federal
legislature had limited, enumerated power, while most rights remained
with the states, or the people. The question is, then, what actions taken
by our Legislature today would constitute the “abuse” that Wilson
fought so ardently to avoid? Passing a portion of a statute that
effectively ends federalism regarding state and individual rights may
qualify as a sound answer.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: EXPANSION LEADING TO
UNCHECKED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
As Wilson notes, the federal government only has the power
80
granted by the Constitution. The extent of the federal legislature’s
power comes from Article I, Section 8, which explicitly lists all of
Congress’ powers. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 grants Congress the
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
81
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The part of the clause
giving the federal legislature the authority to regulate commerce among
the several states has often been called the “Commerce Clause” and will
82
be referred to as such. Commerce regulated under this clause is often
referred to as “interstate commerce” and will also be referred to as such
83
here.
Congress’ power to regulate any activity under the umbrella idea
that the state or the individual is engaging in “interstate commerce” has
84
expanded on a sigmoid curve since the Constitution’s adoption. A full
79

Id.
James Wilson, Speech At A Public Meeting In Philadelphia, supra note 25.
81
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82
Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 849-93 (2002), available at
http://www.constitution.org/lrev/bork-troy.htm.
83
Id.
84
See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
82-143 (Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 16th ed. 2007) (1937).
80
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review of this growth in federal legislative authority will show that,
while the Commerce Clause has already been used in ways unstated by
Wilson, the clause can still be kept within some form of the federalist
framework he advocated. Conversely and logically, continuing to
expand the Commerce Clause’s power to include the right to regulate
non-activity will signal the end of the federalist system as Wilson knew
it.
85

Gibbons v. Ogden - The New York Legislature granted Robert
Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right to operate steamboats
86
in New York waters. Thomas Gibbons began operating a competing
steamboat service, licensed under a federal statute for “vessels to be
87
employed in the coasting trade and fisheries.” Chief Justice Marshall
upheld Gibbons’ right to operate despite New York’s law because the
commerce in question was not simply confined to New York, but
88
expanded beyond the state’s borders. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.
The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to
indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an
apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would
not have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to
every description. The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or subject
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a
State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be,
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the
nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States
generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the
general powers of the government. The completely internal
commerce of a State, then may, be considered as reserved for the
89
State itself.

85
86
87
88
89

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
See generally id.
Id. at 194-95. (emphasis added).
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Because the federal steamboats were engaged in interstate
90
commerce, the federal law was constitutional. Under the Supremacy
Clause, any valid federal law preempts state law, so the federal
steamboat license stood against Livingston and Fulton’s steamboat
91
monopoly issued by New York.
Marshall also touched upon the judiciary’s role in overturning
legislative statutes under the Commerce Clause:
[The commerce power], like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
[C]onstitution. . .The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections, are . . .the sole restraints on which they have
92
relied, to secure them from its abuse.

It is clear that Marshall believes the will of the people should be
the final voice of reason, subject only to whether the Constitution
provides Congress with the initial right to act. Whether the federal
legislature possessed that right in the first place would continue to be
scrutinized judicially.
The Supreme Court implemented various approaches to ensure the
93
parameters of the Commerce Clause were defined and understood.
A. Direct Effects Test
This test, while in line with Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 as
actually written, is the most restrictive approach to interpreting the
Commerce Clause.
94

United States v. E.C. Knight Co. – The Court ruled that
95
manufacturing ninety-eight percent of the nation’s sugar “bore no
direct relation to commerce between the states” and could not be
96
regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court has not favored this
approach, and instead developed an expansive view of the term
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See generally id. at 194-95.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 85.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Id. at 44.
Id. at 17.
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“interstate commerce,” using the “substantial economic effects” test for
the most part, while at times also using the “stream of commerce” test.
B. Stream of Commerce Test
97

The Court has also used a “stream of commerce” test. Under this
approach, some local, or intrastate activities could be regulated by
Congress because the activities could be viewed as “in” commerce or as
98
an integral part of the “current of commerce.”
99

Swift & Co. v. United States – Justice Holmes wrote:
Commerce . . . is not a technical legal conception, but a practical
one, drawn from the course of business. ‘When cattle are sent for
sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end
their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so,
with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the
stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course,
the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States,
and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such
100
commerce.’

Under this interpretation, the federal government can regulate
some intrastate activity under the Commerce Clause.
C. Substantial Economic Effects Test
The most expansive test used by the Supreme Court is the
“substantial economic effects” test which holds that any activity (locally
or interstate) that, in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce
physically or economically is part of interstate commerce and can be
regulated by the federal government. It is this view that has been the
basis for the Commerce Clause’s nearly unlimited use as the basis for
federal regulation.
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co v. United States [The Shreveport
101
Rate Case] – The Court upheld congressional regulation of intrastate
rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic by raising
97
98
99
100
101

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 87.
Id.
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
Id. at 398-99.
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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the prices for routes between Texas and Louisiana compared to routes
that stayed within Texas. Justice Hughes wrote:
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so
related that the government of the one involves the control of the other,
it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and
dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of
its constitutional authority and the State, and not the nation, would be
supreme within the national field . . . This is not to say that Congress
possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a state, as
such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect interstate
commerce [of a state], and to take all measures necessary or appropriate
to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may
102
thereby be controlled.
D. The National “Police” Regulation
Congress increasingly used the Commerce Clause in the late 19th
103
century to handle problems of morality and criminality.
104

Champion v. Ames [The Lottery Case] - The Court upheld the
105
Federal Lottery Act of 1895. The Act prohibited the importation,
106
mailing, and interstate transport of lottery tickets. Justice Harlan
wrote:
Lottery tickets are subjects of traffic and therefore are subjects of
commerce. . .the suppression of nuisances injurious to public health
or morality is among the most important duties of government. If a
State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries
within its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that
inhere in the raising of money, in that mode, why may not Congress,
invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several
States, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by carrying
107
of lottery tickets from one state to another?

The Court used this precedent to sustain many laws prohibiting

102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 352-53 (internal citations omitted).
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 87.
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
Id. at 363-364.
Id.
Id. at 354-56.
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objects or people deemed dangerous from interstate commerce. It is
important to note that even here, Harlan and the other Justices still
analyzed whether some activity was occurring between the states.
109

Hammer v. Dagenhart [The Child Labor Case] - The Court
struck down a congressional act of 1916 that excluded the products of
110
child labor from interstate commerce. Justice Day wrote:
[The commerce power] is one to control the means by which
commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the
assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying
it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that [the Lottery
Case, Hipolite Egg and Hoke] establish the doctrine that the power to
regulate given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to
prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities. [These] cases
demonstrate the contraryFalse[In each] of these instances the use of
interstate transportation was necessary to accomplish the harmful
111
results.

Hammer shows the importance of first engaging in commerce
between states, as the Constitution explicitly states, before federal
action can be justified.
E. The New Deal
Even though the federal government argued that the targeted
activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (using the most
expansive view of the commerce clause possible), the courts initially
invalidated much of the New Deal measures that attempted to use the
112
Commerce Clause as the basis for federal regulation.
113

Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. – The Court
ruled that Congress lacked the power to establish a compulsory

108
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 88; see also Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding the confiscation of preserved eggs that did not have a
proper label); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the prohibition of
transporting women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes).
109
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
110
Id. at 277.
111
Id. at 269-71 (emphasis added).
112
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 91-92.
113
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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114

retirement and pension plan for all railroad carriers. Justice Roberts
wrote for the majority and stated, “[T]he act is not in purpose or effect a
regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the
115
Constitution.” Roberts further wrote, “[I]s it not apparent that [such
regulations] are really and essentially related solely to the social welfare
of the worker, and therefore remote from any regulation of commerce as
116
such?”
117

Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States – The Court held a
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, authorizing
the President to issue “codes of fair competition for the trade or
industry,” unconstitutional in relation to regulating wages and hours of
118
individuals within one state. Chief Justice Hughes rejected both the
119
stream of commerce and substantial effects tests. Justice Hughes
120
wrote that these were not transactions in interstate commerce:
If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of
employees in the internal commerce of the state, because of their
relation to costs and prices, and their indirect effect on interstate
commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted
over other elements of cost, also affecting price, such as the number
121
of employees, rent, advertising, methods of doing business, etc.

Justice Day and the Court looked at the impact that this one
decision could have on federal legislative power in terms of opening
Pandora’s box. The Court’s concerns are in line with James Wilson’s
concerns that the expansion of legislative power is the most difficult to
undo.
122

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. – The Court invalidated a federal
123
regulation for minimum wage and maximum hours in coal mines.
Justice Sutherland wrote “the effect of the labor provisions of the
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
Id. at 368.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 523.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 92.
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-43.
Id. at 549.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Id.
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[Act] . . . primarily falls upon production, and not upon commerce.”
Despite Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s attempts to have the
legislature pass a wide variety of measures under the Commerce Clause,
the courts looked at the words and phrases in the Constitution to
determine which actions were permissible, much as Wilson did during
his time on the Supreme Court. However, frustrated with the Supreme
125
Court, Roosevelt launched his court-packing plan. Roosevelt’s
ongoing plan sought to put more judges on the bench and to remove
126
judges over seventy years of age. While the controversy was ongoing
with hearings in the Senate, the Court seemed to change direction in a
number of decisions sustaining regulatory statutes under the Commerce
Clause.
127

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. – The Court held valid the
National Labor Relations Act, which prohibited unfair labor practices in
128
interstate commerce. Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their
activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the
129
paralyzing consequences of industrial war?

The Court here is clearly shifting toward an expansive view of the
Commerce Clause, and this shift constitutes the move away from the
actual words and phrases in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution. The Court also moved away from federalism as advocated
and understood by James Wilson.
130

United States v. Darby Lumber Co. - The Court held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established minimum wage and
maximum hours for employees involved in the production of goods in
interstate commerce, was valid against Darby, even though Darby was

124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 304.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 94.
Id. at 95.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 41-42.
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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131

engaged in manufacturing lumber within Georgia.
As to the prohibition on shipments of proscribed goods in interstate
commerce, Justice Stone wrote “[w]hile manufacture is not, of itself,
interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is
such commerce, and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is
132
indubitably a regulation of the commerce.” The Court explicitly
133
overruled Hammer. Notably, the Court continued to analyze whether
134
activity between the states existed at some point.
As to the validity of federal wage and hour requirements, the Court
135
upheld these as well. Justice Stone wrote:
[T]he evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor
conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for
competition by the goods so produced with those produced under the
prescribed or better labor conditions; and the consequent dislocation
of the commerce itself caused by the impairment or destruction of
local businesses by competition made effective through interstate
commerce. The Act is thus directed at the suppression of a method
or kind of competition in interstate commerce which it has in effect
condemned as “unfair.” . . . The means adopted by § 15(a)(2) for the
protection of interstate commerce by the suppression of the
production of the condemned goods for interstate commerce is so
related to the commerce, and so affects it, as to be within the reach of
136
the commerce power.

However, even Darby is well removed from where the Court
would next take the Commerce Clause. Wickard v. Filburn represents a
ruling diverging from the actual words in phrases in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 as James Wilson understood it.
137

Wickard v. Filburn – In Wickard, Filburn was a farmer in Ohio
who produced a small acreage of wheat to sell, feed his livestock, use
138
for seed, and make flour for home consumption. Under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Filburn’s quota for wheat
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115-17.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 122-25.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 122-23.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 114.
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production was approximately three acres, but he harvested
139
approximately seven acres. Even though Filburn’s production was
limited to his farm, the Court ruled that the activity was a part of
interstate commerce. The Court wrote, “even if appellee’s activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
140
economic effect on interstate commerce False”
Wickard either represents the outermost boundary of federal power
under the Commerce Clause, or the ruling was outside the parameters of
the Commerce Clause from the start. When compared with the
statement “[t]he Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states . . . ,” this ruling seems
141
inconsistent with the words and phrases in the Constitution. Yet, under
this ruling, most activities would be deemed to fall within interstate
commerce.
142

Perez v. United States - In determining the constitutionality of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibiting loan sharking under the
Commerce Clause, the Court reiterated the parameters of interstate
143
commerce. Federal legislative action under the Commerce Clause was
permissible (1) to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, (2) to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
persons and things within interstate commerce, and (3) to regulate
144
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
V. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW REGARDING
FEDERAL LEGISLATION PASSED UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
The Supreme Court did not invalidate any legislation as exceeding
145
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause for sixty years. The
Court used the substantial effects test which, as noted above, establishes
a low bar for activity to be deemed interstate commerce. However, in
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 119.
Id. at 125.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 150.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 106.
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the past fifteen years, the Court has returned to ensuring that the bar still
exists.
146
United States v. Lopez – The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990
147
made it a crime to knowingly possess firearms in school zones. Lopez
148
brought a handgun to school and was charged under the Act. The
Court held that having a handgun in school did not substantially affect
149
commerce between the states. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[e]ven
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a
150
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”
151

United States v. Morrison - The Violence Against Women Act
152
awarded civil remedies to victims of gender-based violent crimes.
Following the ruling in Lopez, the Court wrote:
Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in
those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic
endeavor . . . Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
153
sense of the phrase, economic activity.
154

Gonzales v. Raich - The Court upheld the federal legislation
banning the growth of marijuana pertaining to strictly intrastate
155
activity. The Court used the maximum capacity of the substantial
effects test just as it did in Wickard. Justice Stevens wrote, “[i]n both
cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be
it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in
156
the national market for that commodity.”
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) ( Supp. V 1988)).
Id.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 560.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 601-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995)).
Id. at 611, 613.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id at 10-33
Id. at 2
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As noted above, James Wilson was a strong proponent of
federalism. It is axiomatic that using the Commerce Clause for activities
well beyond what would first be thought of as “Commerce between the
States” brings with it a loss of federalism, as the states, or the people,
are denied the right to engage in some activity as the states or the people
see fit. However, even this framework leaves the potential for a
federalist system to work because when the states, or the people, are not
engaged in any activity the federal legislature cannot reach them
through the Commerce Clause.
VI. THE END OF FEDERALISM
In 2010, Congress passed The Patient Protection and Affordable
157
Care Act. Section 1501 states:
An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013
ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who
is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential
coverage for such monthFalse If an applicable individual fails to
meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months during
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, except as provided in
subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the
158
individual in the amount determined under subsection (c).

Section 1501 sets forth, as the basis for the federal legislative
action, the following findings: “The individual responsibility
requirement provided for in this section (in this subsection referred to as
the “requirement”) is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects
159
described in paragraph (2).” Paragraph (2) lists the ways that health
160
care has a substantial impact on the national economy. Finally,
paragraph (3) states that under the Supreme Court ruling in United
161
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, insurance markets
162
fall within interstate commerce.
Importantly, Congress’ findings did not base the individual

157

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
158
Id. at 244.
159
Id. at 242.
160
Id. at 243.
161
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
162
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 124 Stat. at 244.
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mandate on generating revenue under the tax and spend provision.
Although an analysis here would show that Section 1501 is a penalty
and not a tax (as described in the statute, “there is hereby imposed a
penalty with respect to the individual in the amount determined under
164
subsection (c)”), Congress itself based the propriety of the individual
165
mandate on the Commerce Clause. As such, the Commerce Clause is
the basis for examination.
If Section 1501 of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
is upheld, the system of federalism Wilson cited so often, whereby the
federal government has limited power, reserving most of the rights to
the states, or to the people, would be destroyed. One clause in Article I
would be the basis for the federal Legislature’s ability to regulate
virtually anything. Every prior Commerce Clause case analyzed some
activity to determine if the activity was commercial. Without activity,
no commerce can possibly exist. Here, even if one is the farthest
removed from engaging in commerce between the states (not engaging
in any activity at all), one would still be subject to federal regulation.
Therefore, the sphere for the states and individuals to operate without
federal intervention would be abolished.
Fatal to coinciding Section 1501 with any reasonable Wilsonian
view is the fact that the people would be subject to federal power at all
times. There is no possible way that the author of the words “[W]e the
people” in the Constitution contemplated Congressional power that
usurped virtually all-individual autonomy under the Commerce Clause.
Wilson’s view that the Constitution left most of the rights to the states
and the people would be obliterated.
If the COD ever intended the Commerce Clause to be used in this
manner, why would the committee list the powers of the federal
government at all? Similar to Wilson’s original contention, the federal
legislature would have been given general rights, broadly encompassing
the right to mandate that people participate in a government program.
Alternatively, the COD could have simply added the Commerce Clause
and stopped at this point, as it would have encompassed virtually all
activity.
Wilson’s views on granting general rights did not prevail in the
163

Id. at 242.
Id. (“[T]here is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the individual in the
amount determined under subsection (c).”) (emphasis added).
165
See generally The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501.
164
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COD, and Rutledge and Randolph were able to include specific,
enumerated rights. After Wilson, Rutledge, Randolph, Ellsworth and
Gorham completed their work drafting the Constitution, Wilson
advocated the merits of enumerated rights as much as anyone; he used
the words and phrases within the Constitution as the basis for his
Supreme Court decisions, relying heavily on their reasonable meaning.
Wilson worked tirelessly to ensure that the judiciary had
independence from the legislature so the judiciary could determine with
impunity that the legislature’s actions were constitutional (whether the
Federal Judiciary or Pennsylvania’s). While on the Supreme Court,
Wilson also showed that he was a proponent of judicial review and
limited Congressional power.
VI. CONCLUSION
James Wilson was one of the most influential founding fathers of
the 18th Century in creating the Constitution. James Wilson’s work to
refine Pennsylvania’s Constitution by reigning in the legislature and
giving the judiciary autonomy, his statements on the Constitutional
enumeration of power and limited federal rights, and his Supreme Court
opinions, demonstrate that James Wilson was a proponent of individuals
retaining much autonomy under the United States Constitution. A
reasonable analysis of James Wilson’s views on the Constitution and
Supreme Court case law generally suggests that Section 1501 should be
struck down under judicial review. Neither James Wilson nor any
Justice writing a Supreme Court opinion to date contemplated nonaction as a basis for enacting the Commerce Clause because the
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the notion that the Constitution
maintains states’ and individual rights.

